One point of data we have is the Chinese Vulnerability reporting team apparently takes a long time on certain bugs. My previous analysis was that they used to take bugs they knew were blown and then give them to various Chinese low-end actors to blast all over the Internet as their way of informally muddying the waters (and protecting their own ecosystem). But a more modern analysis indicates a formal and centralized process perhaps.
So here's what I want to say, as a thought experiment: Many parts of the VEP problem completely map homomorphically to finding a vulnerability and then asking yourself if it is exploitable.
For example, with the DirtyCow vulnerability. Is it at all exploitable? Does it affect Android? How far back does the vulnerability go? Does it affect GRSecced systems? What about RHEL? What about stock kernel.org systems but with uncommon configurations. What about systems with low memory or systems with TONS OF MEMORY. What about systems under heavy load? What about future kernels - is this a bug likely to still exist in a year?
|Trees have roots and exploits get burned, and there's a strained analogy in here somewhere. :)|
The list of questions is endless, and each question requires an experienced Linux kernel exploitation team at least a day to answer. And that's just one bug. Imagine you had a hundred bugs, or a thousand bugs, every year, and you had to answer these questions. Where is this giant team of engineers that instead of writing more kernel exploits is answering all these questions for the VEP?
Every team who has ever had an 0day has seen an advisory come out, and said "Oh, that's our bug" and then when the patch came out, you realized that was NOT your bug at all, just another bug that looked very similar and was even maybe in the same function. Or you've seen patches come out and your exploit stopped working and you thought "I'm patched out" but the underlying root cause was never handled or was handled improperly.
We used to make a game out of second guessing Microsoft's "Exploitability" indexes. "Oh, that's not exploitable? KOSTYA GO PROVE THEM WRONG!"
In other words: I worry about workload a lot with any of these processes that require high levels of technical precision at the upper reaches of government.