Back in the day (two decades ago) when Brandon Baker was at Microsoft writing Palladium, which then became the Next Generation Trusted Computing Base, I had a lot of questions, and the easiest way to answer those questions was "How would you create a GnuPG binary that could run on an untrusted kernel, which could still encrypt files without the kernel being able to get the keys?" You end up with memory fencing and a chain of trust that comes from Dell and signing and sealing and trusted peripherals and all that good stuff.
The other thing people penciled out was "Remote Attestation" which essentially was "How do you play Quake 2 online and prove to the SERVER that you're not cheating." In this sense, Trusted Computing is not so much Trusted BY the User, but Trusted AGAINST the User.
Doom Eternal removed their Ring0 anti-cheat but it's not that competitive a game really, especially compared to Valorant or Plants vs. Zombies
Because writing game cheats is somehow (in this dystopia) extremely lucrative (see this Immunity presentation on it), game developers have quite logically invested in a budget implementation of Remote Attestation, largely by including mandatory kernel drivers which get installed alongside your game. These kernel drivers sometimes load bytecode from the internet, are encrypted and obfuscated, and have a wide view of what is running on your system - one you as the gamer or security analyst can not interpret any more than you can what scripts are run by your AV.
To add to your paranoia, as you probably DON'T know, most gaming companies are owned or controlled by Tencent, a Chinese conglomerate which is also very active in cyber security, so to speak, even though they are often headquartered in the US.
To put it directly, nobody wants to say that Tencent can control nearly every machine in the world via obfuscated bytecode that runs directly in the kernel, but it's not a whole lot of steps between here and there. Of course, aside from direct manipulation gaming data, which includes lots of PII, offers a massive value to any SIGINT organization, has huge implications for running COVCOM networks (c.f. the plot of Homeland), and is generally a high value target simply because it is assumed to be such a low value target.
We spend so much of our time trying to define critical infrastructure, but one easy way is to think about your network posture from an attacker's perspective, which hopefully this blogpost did without raising your quarantine-shredded anxiety levels too much.