Thursday, November 14, 2019

A Lot To Feel

Last month I gave two talks on cyber policy, one in Israel and one in Tokyo, Japan.  What I learned was this: The two places could not be further apart!

The Israeli conference was called ICT and you can view their extensive YouTube channel here, but you probably won't so I will summarize it for you in this post in two words: Terrorism bad.

It was election season in Israel, and every single Israeli political figure stepped across the stage of the conference to get interviewed on their positions on the Palestinian Territories. They spoke in great depth, taking tough questions from interviewers about their policies and positions, most of which made any right wing American political figure seem like Bernie Sanders. Surreally pictures of these politicians were on billboards all over the country, often with Donald Trump standing in a close hug.

I say this because not just because Americans cannot leave politics behind at the border. At this conference, partially held in an Israeli Defense University, American and Israeli politicians, spooks, policy makers, and other nations came together to proclaim their continued support in the fight against terror. One of the standout talks was Albania's Minister of Foreign Affairs, which is one of the few talks not on the YouTube channel. It was packed so I stood in the back, ignoring the conspicuous security team that scanned the already extremely well vetted audience the entire time he spoke.

Another amazing talk was Facebook's policy person, who came to explain how not EVERYTHING is its problem and frankly "Just block everything bad as it happens" is an annoying thing for governments to keep asking for.

I want to point out that for many people, when you speak a conference, you expect them to pay for your flight and hotel. But at the high end of conferences, this does not happen!

At the VERY highest end, the conference itself can be more aptly described as a small roundtable discussion at a five star hotel with a paid-for staff of communications experts to organize everything and elicit collaboration since everyone is a speaker and expert at their topic. Typically at these you'll have current government officials and former government officials still making policy decisions behind the scenes as well as the top executives at various large conglomerates and you'll pay for everything as well as a conference "entry" fee that goes to the organizers. In return you'll get a neat printed out pamphlet with everyone's name and position and a picture of them, which saves time when wheeling and dealing.

At a slightly lower (but still super high) end, you still pay for everything (other than conference entry, which is sponsored by the host government or some large corporation or both) and the talks end up being "panels" with some people choosing to do a powerpoint presentation with their fifteen minute introduction speech and some just rambling.

My feeling on panels is that they are almost always terrible, although there are exceptions, like this one with Jennifer Cafarella discussing ISIS's potential reconstitution. But almost because the talks are typically not great, these kinds of conferences attract a special crowd of interested parties, to the point where the local service had someone ask me about what I was doing there and what my background was. I answered one hundred percent honestly - that I'm an executive in a computer company that offers hosting, and that I have an expensive side hobby of attending conferences like this because I masochistically enjoy cyber policy debates. Somehow this was so unbelievable that he then followed up with, "...What other cover stories do you use?" to which I replied "collage student?" which, of course is the one all the Israeli's use at Defcon every year.

Also speaking at both conferences was Sophia d’Antoine and it was sometimes fun to see people not realize how much background she had on both the technical (her speciality is automated program analysis) and policy aspects.

What I mean from "the two places could not be further apart" is that Japan and Israel are almost orthogonal in their approaches to all the important policy problems in the space. In Japan there was a focus on the rule of law as defined very closely with international norms creations efforts. Pacifism is a virtue. Of course, should the Japanese decide to go offensive and use their cyber capabilities for deterrence as I and others recommended, the world would shake.

Israel has a very different view on things. Just down the road from the big Microsoft building in the hip tech town of Herzliya is NSO Group, currently being sued by Facebook for selling 0day capabilities, in what is a silly lawsuit that demonstrates the failure of international norms efforts between nation states that now these sorts of things are hashed out between large corporations.

Probably the most amusing part of ICT for me was when at the end of the panel I was on the moderator asked some simple questions. "What happened to ISIS's cyber capabilities? Why haven't they developed as we thought they would into a force to be reckoned with?" These were Talmudically hypothetical questions of course. Looking out at the crowd you could see the answer in their eyes, locked into hungry reptilian slits, an entire conference of deadly spook subclasses dedicated to removing that particular threat from the world.

Friday, October 18, 2019

Unexpected Norms Setters

Paper Review: The unexpected norm-setters: Intelligence agencies in cyberspace

I wanted to do a line by line review of Ilina Georgieva's recent piece on cyber norms because on a brief read-through, I liked a lot of it. That said, the difficulty with reviewing policy pieces is you tend to think the ones that AGREE with you are naturally genius, which is not always the case. So after a more thorough review, there are a lot of serious issues with the piece and these are painfully listed below (if you happen to be Iliana).

To be specific, the paper focuses on the norms implications of NSA's leaked tool TERRITORIAL DISPUTE which is, not really this at all, and it's weird how confused the author sounds trying to describe it:
This article examines a particular technique of infiltrating computer networks to gather intelligence data (i.e., computer network exploitation or CNE), in order to exemplify the norm-setting impact of intelligence agencies.

What TeDi (to use her terminology) really is, is a simple script that you can run once you are on a box to find out if another APT is also installed on that box, complete with a few simple signatures, essentially the simplest and dumbest anti-virus of all time. It is a not a "technique of infiltrating computer networks" and the main flaw of the whole paper is that it's impossible to say what the norm implied by TeDi is in a simple sentence. Without a very clear statement as to what the norm is, it's folly to analyze or draw any conclusions.

Another major issue with the paper is purely stylistic, in the sense that many international relations papers will say things like:

The exploitation technique portrays a norm of cyber espionage that is
widely implemented by the intelligence community.

But we have no public evidence that any other group has anything like TeDi, or a clear understanding of what norm it would imply if they did.

The paper also confuses activities taking place because there is a norm of behavior with activities taking place because operational security (OPSEC) measures are part of how you do this business. This includes not leaving your rootkits around to be looked at by your opponents, which is the obvious purpose of TeDi. The attacker running TeDi wants a minimal number of signatures because they:

  • Assume their checks will leak as someone may eventually detect them via some sort of honeypot
  • Know that every check they run is taking time away from running the mission of their operation, and adds potential complicated failure modes to something already difficult to do

Any real critique of the paper would have to put words in the author's mouth - starting with what you propose specifically is the norm implied by the existence of TeDi. That seems a bit like tilting at windmills. A better question around TeDi is probably what it means to the FBI or other defensive domestic teams that these signatures were not shared more widely, but then we don't know that they were not.

It's true, as the paper points out, that almost all discussion of cyber norms is fantasy. Every paper is a broadside focused on trying to make some imaginary opponent believe they should adopt a particular set of rules. Nobody wants to say what the current rules of the game are, perhaps because it means admitting to things they would rather not say out loud.

Thursday, October 3, 2019

CNAS is wrong about how easy regulating AI is

Like is your plan to control a certain amount of data or only labeled data ? What is an "amount" of data when different formats of data are obviously much different sizes... And we don't know how much data is useful...

Of course then we get to talk about "dual use" databases. And the efficiency of controlling all non-labeled databases ?