|A shibboleth for whether you should be doing cyber policy work. :)|
ISR has to be anticipatory, comprehensive, and real time. And because of that, I'm reading the new compendium of essays edited by Herb Lin and Amy Zegart. The book is dense and long, so I'm not done with it, but I get a very different feeling from it so far than what they've intended I think.
Start by listening to this podcast:
In it, a few interesting questions come to light. For example, they say things like this:
- Does not know why, unlike with nuclear, the scientific community has not gone into policy with cyber (sociology of knowledge problem)
- Does not think you need a "CS Degree" to work on cyber policy (in comparison to nuclear work, which was more technical in some way)
Obviously I disagree with both of those things.
There are things you always hear in this kind of podcast:
- A hazy enumeration of the ways the cyber domain is different
- War versus not-war legal hairsplitting
- Either wishful thinking or doleful laments about cyber norms
- Massive over-parsing of vague throwaway comments from government officials
For example, the Differences of the Cyber Domain (from this podcast):
- Intangible - manipulates information
- It's man made! Laws of physics don't constrain information-weapons so much as imagination.
- Target Dependance
- Accumulation problem - lots of copies of the same malware doesn't help. Exploits are time-delimited in a way that is quite different from capabilities in the real world.
Ok, so some real talk here: The first thing a hacker learns is that code and data are the same thing, and both are just state space under the covers. This is why when you build a fuzzer, you can measure "code coverage" but you know that you're just estimating what you REALLY want to explore, which is state space coverage. It's why your exploits can use the thread environment block to store code, or why every language complex enough to be useful has an injection bugclass. I have a whole post coming soon about shellcode encoder decoders to really drive the history of this thing home. ADMutate anyone?
Anyways, once you understand that in your gut, the way a hacker does, the cyber domain is not at all confusing. It becomes predictable, which is another word for computable.
Deep down, the most ironic thing is Lin's statements about the different physics of the physical and cyber domains because the theory of computation is ALSO the physics of quantum mechanics, which is what we learned when we were building nuclear bombs.